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Grandfathered into Commerce:  Assessing the Federal 
Reserve’s Proposed Rules Limiting Physical 
Commodities Activities of Financial Holding 
Companies 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When the Deepwater Horizon’s oil pipe broke open in the Gulf 
of Mexico, millions of people watched the underwater camera showing 
BP’s oil pumping into the ocean.1  BP neither owned, nor operated the rig 
that exploded and sank after killing eleven people.2  Still, that oil spill has 
gone down in history as the “BP Oil Spill.”3  BP spent nearly $62 billion 
to resolve the legal claims associated with the event and to restore 
goodwill and its reputation.4  But what if instead of the BP Oil Spill, it 
had been the Morgan Stanley Oil Spill?5   
Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs are the only two financial 
holding companies (“FHCs”) who benefit from a provision of the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (“GLBA”), which allows qualifying 
FHCs to engage in the extraction and transport of physical commodities.6  
In general, commodities trading by FHCs must be deemed 
 
 1. Michael McCarthy, BP Fights to Limit the Slick—And the Damage to its Reputation, 
INDEPENDENT (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/bp-
fights-to-limit-the-slick-ndash-and-the-damage-to-its-reputation-1959598.html.  
 2. Id. (explaining that Deepwater Horizon was owned and operated by a Swiss drilling 
company, Transocean, whereas BP had leased the rig and owned the license to drill in the 
seabed). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Michael Amon & Tapan Panchal, BP Puts Tab for Gulf Disaster at $62 Billion, WALL 
ST. J. (July 14, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/bp-estimates-remaining-material-
deepwater-liabilities-1468517684.   
 5. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 113TH CONG., REP. ON WALL STREET BANK 
INVOLVEMENT WITH PHYSICAL COMMODITIES 284 (Comm. Print 2014) (describing a 2006 
Morgan Stanley investment in a company that owned approximately 100 oil tankers) 
[hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT]. 
 6. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(A)-(B) (2016) (outlining the general scope of activities 
for financial holding companies, namely activities that are financial in nature or incidental to 
such financial activity, as well as complementary to a financial activity); 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o) 
(2016); BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., & OFFICE OF 
THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND THE FINANCIAL 
STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL PURSUANT TO SECTION 620 OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 16 
(2016) [hereinafter SECTION 620 REPORT]. 
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“complementary to a financial activity” by the Federal Reserve Board 
(“Federal Reserve” or “FRB),7 or fall into a Grandfather Provision 
(“Grandfather Provision” or “Grandfather Authority”) that allows two 
FHCs—Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs—to continue engaging in a 
broader range of nonbanking activities than would otherwise be allowed 
under the complementary powers.8  
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”)9 Section 620 called on the federal bank 
regulators to study the activities and investments allowed for bank entities 
and to examine the risks those activities might create for the safety and 
soundness of the American financial system.10  Over six years later, on 
September 8, 2016, the federal bank regulators11 released their “Report 
to the Congress and Financial Stability Oversight Council Pursuant to 
Section 620 of the Dodd-Frank Act” (“Section 620 Report”).12  In that 
report, the Federal Reserve expressed concerns about FHCs’ ability to 
engage in physical commodities activities.13  The Federal Reserve 
recommended Congress repeal this Grandfather Provision.14  
Specifically, the Federal Reserve called on Congress to repeal the 
Grandfather Authority that in practice allowed just two FHCs to own 
physical commodity assets and infrastructure for commodity storage, 
shipment, and use.15  
Shortly after releasing the Section 620 Report on September 8, 
2016, the Federal Reserve released a notice of proposed rulemaking 
(“NPR”) to address the concerns about the risks of commodity activities 
by FHCs.16  The September 30, 2016 NPR attempted to limit these 
 
 7. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B) (2016); 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(ii) (2017). 
 8. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 10.  
 9. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
620, 12 U.S.C. § 5301 (2016). 
 10. Id.; SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 1. 
 11. The Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the 
Office of the Comptroller of Currency. 
 12. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 1. 
 13. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 16. 
 14. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 28.  
 15. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 29–30 (including recommendations from the 
Fed, FDIC and OCC.  This note covers only the Fed recommendation to repeal the section 
4(o) Grandfather activities).  
 16. Regulations Q and Y; Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory Requirements for 
Activities of Financial Holding Companies Related to Physical Commodities and Risk-Based 
Capital Requirements for Merchant Banking Investments (“September 2016 Proposed Rule 
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commodity activities through stricter capital requirements, activity limits, 
and greater required public disclosure of data relating to these activities.17  
Since it would require legislative action to amend this statutory provision, 
repealing the Grandfather Provision is outside the scope of the Federal 
Reserve’s authority.18  Therefore, in the NPR the Federal Reserve was 
limited to increasing safeguards for physical commodities activities, 
which reflect the Federal Reserve’s view of the relative risk of those 
activities.19  
Many would argue that all physical commodities activities are 
fundamentally riskier than traditional bank activities, and engaging in 
these activities undermines the separation of banking and commerce.20  
This raises the question of whether banks should be involved in these 
activities at all—an issue the Federal Reserve addressed in its Section 620 
Report.21  The Grandfather Provision allows FHCs to engage in a broader 
range of activities than permitted under the complementary powers.22  
The activities permitted under the Grandfather Provision—such as 
transporting physical commodities through a pipeline or an oil tanker—
are more prone to a catastrophic event than the activities permitted under 
the complementary authorities and merchant banking powers, which are 
more financial in nature.23  This Note analyzes separation of banking and 
commerce issues that arise out of the FHCs’ authority to engage in 
physical commodities trading under the Grandfather Provision and 
whether the Federal Reserve is in the best position to address these issues 
through a proposed rulemaking or whether it is better left for Congress to 
remove the Grandfather Provision altogether.24  
 
on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory Requirements”), 81 Fed. Reg. 67220, 67225 
(proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 & 225). 
 17. Id. (proposing several new restrictions on commodity activities. This Note focuses 
on the proposals relating specifically to grandfathered activities.). 
 18. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 28.  
 19. September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory 
Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220, 67226–27 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 217 and 225). 
 20. Id. at 67221. 
 21. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 28. 
 22. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(A)–(B), (o) (2016); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 27. 
 23. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 29. 
 24. See SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 28 (discussing that recommendations by 
the Federal Reserve Board to make statutory changes with regard to special exemptions for 
FHCs will require congressional action as the changes cannot be accomplished unilaterally 
by the Board). 
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This Note proceeds in six parts.  Part II examines the current 
statutory scheme that allows financial holding companies to engage in 
physical commodities activities.25  Part III lays out a timeline of public 
scrutiny of the Grandfather Provision.26  Part IV discusses the issues 
raised by grandfathered activities and assesses whether the FRB’s 
proposed rules address those concerns.27  Part V raises the possibility that 
repealing the Grandfather Provision would be unfair to firms who 
converted to FHCs under the impression that they could keep those 
grandfathered activities as part of their business.28  Part VI concludes that, 
while the FRB’s proposed rules would be a step in the right direction, 
Congress should step in and repeal the Grandfather Authority outright.29 
II. CURRENT STATUTORY SCHEME AND REGULATION OF 
GRANDFATHERED COMMODITY ACTIVITIES 
A. General Authority for Nonbank Activities 
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (“BHCA”)30 is the 
primary statutory authority controlling the activities of companies that 
control an insured depository institution.31  A “principal purpose” of that 
Act is to “ensur[e] the separation of banking and commerce.”32  The 
BHCA provides limited ways that a bank holding company (“BHC”) may 
permissibly engage in nonbank activities.33  However, in 1999, GLBA 
amended the BHCA and further broadened the range of permissible 
activities for a new subset to BHCs that meet certain conditions and are 
called FHCs.34 
FHCs are permitted to engage in nonbanking activities that are 
“financial in nature,”35 while BHCs are restricted to activities “closely 
 
 25. See infra Part II. 
 26. See infra Part III. 
 27. See infra Part IV. 
 28. See infra Part V. 
 29. See infra Part VI. 
 30. 12 U.S.C. § 1841, et seq. (2016).  
 31. Id. 
 32. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n) (outlining the authority to retain limited nonfinancial 
activities and affiliations); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 1, 3. 
 33. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k).  
 34. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 4–5. 
 35. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)–(4) (activities that are “financial in nature” include: 
underwriting insurance, dealing in securities, etc.).  
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related to banking.”36  FHC investments in physical commodities as a 
principal are included in those permissible “financial in nature” 
activities.37  There are three grants of authority for a FHC to engage in 
physical commodities activities under the BHCA:  (1) the 
“complementary to a financial activity” provision,38 (2) the merchant 
banking provision,39 and (3) the Grandfather Provision.40     
B. The “Complementary to a Financial Activity” Authority 
The GLBA allows any FHC to engage in activities that are 
“complementary to a financial activity.”41  A FHC must obtain 
permission from the FRB on a case-by-case basis for these activities.42  
The FRB, which has exclusive authority to grant permission, considers 
whether the proposed activity is complementary to a financial activity 
and whether the activity would “pose a substantial risk to the safety and 
soundness of depository institutions or the financial system generally.”43  
In approving these activities, the FRB typically imposes restrictions on 
the extent of permitted activity to limit the risk of these activities.44 
FHCs operating under complementary authority are permitted to 
buy and sell physical commodities to settle commodities derivatives.45  
They are not permitted to own or operate “facilities for extraction, 
transportation, storage, or distribution of commodities.”46  Nor are they 
permitted to “process, refine, or otherwise alter commodities.”47  FHCs 
involved in taking and delivering commodities must use reputable third 
party companies for storage and transportation of the commodities that 
they own.48  
 
 36. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 4. 
 37. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 5, 15. 
 38. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B).  
 39. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H). 
 40. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o). 
 41. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B); 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(8)(ii) (2017); SECTION 620 
REPORT, supra note 6, at 15. 
 42. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 15. 
 43. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 15. 
 44. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 24. 
 45. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 25. 
 46. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 25. 
 47. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 25. 
 48. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 25. 
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Finally, to keep this line of business from becoming too large, a 
FHC’s involvement in physical commodity trading activities is limited to 
no more than 5% of the firm’s consolidated Tier 1 capital.49  Essentially, 
the complementary authority allows a FHC to own and trade physical 
commodities, but does not give the FHC authority to store or transport 
those assets in its own facilities.50 
C. Merchant Banking Authority 
The GLBA permits any FHC to make equity investments up to 
100% of a commercial firm under the merchant banking authority of the 
GLBA.51  Banks and BHCs may only own up to 5% of the voting shares 
in a commercial company.52  This limit is designed to ensure that bank 
entities remain passive investors in these commercial companies.53  Post-
GLBA, however, the newly created FHCs were granted authority to 
purchase and control up to 100% of the voting shares of a commercial 
company.54 
The statute forbids the FHC from engaging in the routine 
management of the company, except as may be necessary to obtain a 
reasonable return on investment upon resale.55  This means that the 
investing FHC cannot insert itself into personnel decisions, provide 
business advice, or meet with the company’s employees.56  Essentially, 
the FHC must not intertwine itself with the daily activities of the 
company.57  However, the FHC is allowed to elect any or all of the board 
of directors of a controlled company.58  These restrictions were put in 
place to maintain the separation of banking and commerce.59 
 
 49. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 25. 
 50. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 25. 
 51. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H) (2016). 
 52. Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street:  Banking, Commerce, and 
Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 281 (2013). 
 53. Id. 
 54. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H). 
 55. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(iv). 
 56. Omarova, supra note 52, at 283–84.  
 57. Omarova, supra note 52, at 283–84. 
 58. 12 C.F.R. § 225.171(d)(1) (2017). 
 59. Omarova, supra note 52, at 283. 
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 Further, the GLBA restricts the purpose of investment to bona 
fide merchant or investment banking activities.60  In other words, FHCs 
may only invest in commercial companies with an eye towards profiting 
off the eventual resale of stock in that company.61  Pursuant to that goal, 
the Federal Reserve established caps on the amount of time a FHC is 
permitted to hold an investment.62  Generally, a FHC may hold an 
investment for a maximum of ten years, though it may petition the FRB 
for an extension.63  These limits are meant to enforce the financial—
rather than commercial—nature of these activities and to limit risk.64   
D. Powers Specific to the Grandfather Provision  
Another route to engaging in nonbanking or nonfinancial 
activity—and the focus of this Note—is under Section 4(o) of the GLBA, 
the Grandfather Provision.65  This section provides that any firm that was 
not a BHC but became a FHC after November 12, 1999—the date of the 
GLBA’s enactment—may continue to engage in physical commodities 
trading or investment in commodities, even though not permissible for 
BHCs, if the firm was engaged in such activities as of September 30, 1997 
in the United States.66  The Grandfather Provision effectively permits 
Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to engage in a broader range of 
physical commodity activities than any other authority allowing such 
activities.67  
The Section 4(o) Grandfather Provision offers qualifying FHCs 
advantages over non-grandfathered FHCs.68  First, the Grandfather 
Provision allows a broader range of activities, including transporting, 
refining, extracting, and storing physical commodity assets, than would 
 
 60. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(H)(ii). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.172 (mandating the period of time FHCs are generally permitted 
to hold merchant banking investments). 
 63. 12 C.F.R. § 225.172(b)(1); 12 C.F.R. § 225.172(b)(4)–(5).  
 64. Omarova, supra note 52, at 283. 
 65. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o) (“[A] financial holding company . . . may continue to engage 
in . . . activities related to the trading, sale, or investment in commodities . . . .”). 
 66. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 113TH CONG., 
WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF SAULE T. OMAROVA, PROFESSOR OF LAW, CORNELL UNIVERSITY 10 
(Comm. Print 2014). 
 67. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o) (providing for the Grandfather Authority of certain financial 
holding companies); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 16. 
 68. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o). 
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be allowed under the complementary powers.69  Second, the Grandfather 
Provision does not require the FHC to ask permission from the FRB for 
those activities.70  Third, the Grandfather Provision is subject to less 
restrictive aggregate investment limits than the complementary 
authority.71  
Activities under the Grandfather Provision are not vetted by the 
FRB.72  Unlike complementary physical commodities activities, which 
require explicit permission from the FRB,73 the Section 4(o) Grandfather 
Authority is automatic and a FHC is not required to seek permission from 
or notify the FRB of new activities.74  The GLBA grants permission to 
any company who becomes a FHC after November 12, 1999, to “continue 
to engage in . . . activities related to the trading, sale, or investment in 
commodities and underlying physical properties,”75 so long as the 
company, “or any subsidiary of the holding company, lawfully was 
engaged, directly or indirectly, in any of such activities as of September 
30, 1997, in the United States.”76 There are two possible interpretations 
of this clause.77  The first interpretation is that a qualifying FHC may 
continue to perform only the activities that it legally engaged in prior to 
the grandfather date in 1997.78  The second interpretation takes the view 
that the statute should be read expansively, so that if a FHC’s predecessor 
or subsidiary was engaged in any physical commodity activity prior to 
the 1997 grandfather date, then the FHC is permitted to continue those 
activities and add new activities at any time, subject only to the 5% 
 
 69. Id.; SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 15–16. 
 70. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o); see SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 16 (stating that a 
company that was not a BHC and becomes an FHC after November 12, 1999, may 
automatically continue to engage in activities related to commodities, implying that no 
permission is needed from the FRB).   
 71. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 30. 
 72. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 30. 
 73. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(j)(2)(A) (“In connection with a notice under this subsection, the 
Board shall consider whether performance of the activity by a bank holding company or a 
subsidiary of such company can reasonably be expected to produce benefits to the public, 
such as greater convenience, increased competition, or gains in efficiency, that outweigh 
possible adverse effects, such as undue concentration of resources, decreased or unfair 
competition, conflicts of interests, unsound banking practices, or risk to the stability of the 
United States banking or financial system.”).  
 74. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 30. 
 75. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o). 
 76. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o)(1). 
 77. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 58. 
 78. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 58. 
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activity cap in the statute.79  The Federal Reserve, the agency responsible 
for administering the BHCA, which this provision of the GLBA 
amended, has not taken a position on this question.80 
The legislative history of the GLBA tends to support the first, 
more restrictive interpretation of the grandfather clause.81  Senator Phil 
Gramm explained that the purpose of this amendment was to ensure that 
a securities firm that might become a FHC following GLBA would not 
be forced to divest parts of its business.82  Further, the statutory language 
reads that the provision “‘grandfathers’ existing commodities 
activities.”83  The Senate Banking Committee report on the bill gives no 
indication that the Grandfather Provision is meant to authorize new 
activities.84  Further, the phrase “grandfather clause” is defined in Black’s 
Law Dictionary as a “provision that creates an exemption from the law’s 
effect for something that existed before the law’s effective date.”85  This 
tends to support a narrow interpretation of the statute to include only 
those specific activities that the firm was engaged in as of September 30, 
1997.86  
 
 79. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 58. 
 80. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 58. 
 81. See Amendment #9 Gramm Amendment on Grandfathering Existing Commodities 
Activities, 106th Cong. (1999),  
http://banking.senate.gov/docs/reports/fsmod99/gramm9.htm (showing the legislative history 
of the GLBA and that Senator Phil Gramm’s amendment enlarges the Act’s grandfather 
provisions); COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 58. 
 82. Amendment #9 Gramm Amendment on Grandfathering Existing Commodities 
Activities, 106th Cong. (1999),  
http://banking.senate.gov/docs/reports/fsmod99/gramm9.htm (“The above amendment 
assures that a securities firm currently engaged in a broad range of commodities activities as 
part of its traditional investment banking activities, is not required to divest certain aspects of 
its business in order to participate in the new authorities granted under the Financial Services 
Modernization Act.  This provision “grandfathers” existing commodities activities.”). 
 83. Id. (emphasis added).  
 84. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-127, pt. 1, at 97 (1995) (“The Committee intends that activities 
relating to the trading, sale or investment in commodities and underlying physical properties 
shall be construed broadly and shall include owning and operating properties and facilities 
required to extract, process, store and transport commodities.”); COMMITTEE REPORT, supra 
note 5, at 59.  
 85. Grandfather Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A provision that 
creates an exemption from the law’s effect for something that existed before the law’s 
effective date; specif., a statutory or regulatory clause that exempts a class of persons or 
transactions because of circumstances existing before the new rule or regulation takes 
effect.”). 
 86. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o)(1) (2016) (authorizing an FHC to continue engaging in 
commodity activities which it was engaging in prior to September 30, 1997). 
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Qualifying FHCs, however, have argued for a more expansive 
interpretation of the grandfather authority that allows the FHCs to engage 
in any physical commodity activity, even new activities.87  In its 2008 
application to become a BHC, Goldman Sachs wrote: 
  
The Section 4(o) exemption does not require that a 
company have been engaged prior to September 30, 1997 
in all the activities that it seeks to grandfather under 
Section 4(o) at the time the company becomes a BHC 
[Bank Holding Company], rather it only requires that the 
company have been engaged prior to that date in 
commodity-related activities that were not permissible 
for a BHC in the United States on that date.88 
   
This self-serving interpretation allows Goldman Sachs to engage 
in any new commodity activities that it wants—without requiring 
permission or notification of the FRB—so long as it was engaged in some 
physical commodity activity prior to the grandfather date in 1997.89  
Goldman Sachs argued in a letter to the Federal Reserve that the proposed 
capital increases would “pre-empt Congressional authority by taking 
action in direct contravention to the language of Section 4(o).”90  Without 
citing any statutory authority, Goldman Sachs claims that Congress 
passed the Grandfather Provision because of the expertise and risk 
 
 87. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 60. 
 88. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 60 (quoting “Confidential Application to the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System by The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and 
Goldman Sachs Bank USA Holdings LLC,” prepared by Goldman Sachs, FRB-PSI-303638 -
662, at 648–649, 661). 
 89. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 60 
 90. Letter from John F.W. Rogers on Behalf of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., to 
Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 3–4 (Feb. 21, 2017). 
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management provided by FHCs in the commodities industry.91  Morgan 
Stanley, the other qualifying FHC, has endorsed a similar interpretation.92 
While the statute restricts these grandfathered activities to 
comprising no more than 5% of a FHC’s total consolidated assets, it is 
unclear how strict that limit is.93  The statutory 5% cap could be 
interpreted as “capping only those physical commodity assets for which 
a qualifying FHC cannot find an alternative authorization, either under its 
merchant banking or ‘complementary’ powers.”94  This means that, if the 
FHC is able to present a commodity activity as authorized under its 
merchant banking or complementary powers, the FHC could perhaps 
have the commodities portion of its assets exceed the 5% of total 
consolidated assets limit.95  The current statutory structure is ambiguous 
and has allowed these two FHCs to engage in expansive commodities 
activities.96  
III. TIMELINE OF SCRUTINY OF COMMODITY ACTIVITIES 
After the passage of the GLBA, no firm immediately took 
advantage of the Grandfather Provision.  Investment banks continued to 
engage in physical commodity activities outside the supervisory authority 
 
 91. Id. at 4 (“In enacting Section 4(o), Congress explicitly acknowledged the importance 
of the expertise and risk management provided by FHC intermediaries in the physical 
commodities markets.”).  In fact, the legislative history of the GLBA shows that the 
Grandfather Provision was included so that FHCs would not have to divest parts of their 
business in its conversion to an FHC. See Amendment #9 Gramm Amendment on 
Grandfathering Existing Commodities Activities, 106th Cong. (1999),  
http://banking.senate.gov/docs/reports/fsmod99/gramm9.htm (providing that FHCs cannot 
continue to engage in activities related to trading in commodities unless the holding company 
is predominantly engaged in financial activities).  
 92. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 5, at 60 (“[T]he plain language of Section 4(o) 
authorizes a qualifying financial holding company to continue to engage in any activities 
related to trading, selling, and investing in any type of commodities and related physical 
properties or facilities, if certain conditions are satisfied.  Section 4(o) does not merely 
authorize the retention of investments in commodities or related physical properties or 
facilities made or held on a certain date. Instead, it expressly extends to the continuation of 
any activities related to the trading, selling, and investing in any type of commodities and 
related properties or facilities, if certain conditions are satisfied.”) (emphasis in original). 
 93. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o) (2016); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6, at 1, 16.  
 94. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 113TH CONG., 
WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF SAULE T. OMAROVA, PROFESSOR OF LAW, CORNELL UNIVERSITY 10 
(Comm. Print 2014). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 11.  
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of the Federal Reserve.97  It was not until the 2008 financial crisis when 
some of these investment banks that were involved in physical 
commodity activity converted to FHCs—to become eligible for bailout 
money from the government98—that they came under the regulatory 
authority of the Federal Reserve.99  In response to this new influx of 
potentially risky activities, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
created a “Commodities Team” that initiated a two-year investigation 
into the commodities activities of the ten largest banks under FRB 
supervision.100  
In 2011, the issue of FHC involvement began to seep into the 
mainstream with a widely publicized report of Goldman Sachs hoarding 
12% of the world’s aluminum in a warehouse to artificially inflate 
prices.101  Coca-Cola filed a complaint with the London Metal Exchange 
about this practice, as aluminum prices hit record highs.102  Professor 
Saule T. Omarova referenced that incident with Goldman in her 2013 
Minnesota Law Review piece that took an unprecedented look at the 
extent of physical commodities activities by U.S. banking 
organizations.103  Professor Omarova was called to testify at a November 
2014 Senate Subcommittee hearing on “Wall Street Bank Involvement in 
 
 97. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 113TH CONG., REP. ON WALL STREET BANK 
INVOLVEMENT WITH PHYSICAL COMMODITIES 60 (Comm. Print 2014). 
 98. Kristin Jones, Why Is Everyone Becoming a Bank Holding Company? It’s All About 
the Benjamins, PROPUBLICA, (Nov. 12, 2008), https://www.propublica.org/article/why-is-
everyone-becoming-a-bank-holding-company-1112 (listing eligibility for TARP funding and 
access to Fed Discount window as key reasons for change); Michael J. de la Merced, et al., 
As Goldman and Morgan Shift, a Wall St. Era Ends, DEALBOOK: N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2008), 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/goldman-morgan-to-become-bank-holding-
companies (discussing the rationale behind Goldman Sachs’ and Morgan Stanley’s shift to 
holding companies, such as the ability to combine investment-banking operations with larger 
capital cushions).  
 99. Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Board Approves, 
Pending a Statutory Five-Day Antitrust Waiting Period, the Applications of Goldman Sachs 
and Morgan Stanley to Become Bank Holding Companies (Sept. 21, 2008) https://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20080921a.htm; COMMITTEE 
REPORT, supra note 5, at 50.  
 100. Comment Letter from Elise J. Bean & Tyler E. Gellasch to Robert deV. Frierson, 
Sec’y, Fed. Reserve Sys. Bd. of Governors (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
SECRS/2017/May/20170518/R-1547/R-1547_122216_131639_432161420310_1.pdf.  
 101. Dustin Walsh, Aluminum Bottleneck:  Coke’s complaint:  12% of Global Stockpile 
Held Here, Boosting Prices, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS. (Jun. 26, 2011), http://
www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20110626/FREE/306269994/aluminum.  
 102. Id. 
 103. Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street:  Banking, Commerce, and 
Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 266–68 (2013). 
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Physical Commodities,” along with the heads of Goldman Sachs, Morgan 
Stanley, and JP Morgan Chase.104  The subcommittee issued a report 
authored by Senators Levin and McCain on the extent of FHC physical 
commodity activities and the potential liability those activities created for 
FHCs.105  The subcommittee recommended narrowing the scope of 
permissible commodities activities, strictly enforcing the size limits 
imposed by the grandfather clause, and clarifying the scope of the 
grandfather clause to only permit FHCs to continue engaging in activities 
in which they had already been engaging before the grandfather date.106  
Professor Omarova’s work attracted attention from popular 
media outlets.107  The Daily Show picked up the Goldman Sachs 
aluminum hoarding story and showed a clip of Professor Omarova’s 
testimony on the program.108  
In this environment of public scrutiny, the Federal Reserve issued 
a September 2016 report pursuant to Section 620 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
in which the FRB recommended repeal of the Grandfather Authority.109  
That report was quickly followed by a notice of proposed rulemaking.110  
The comments were originally due in December 2016.111  After the 2016 
presidential election, the Federal Reserve announced that it would allow 
firms an extension on the comment letter deadline, due to the complexity 
of the issues presented.112  The extended due date for comments was 
February 20, 2018.113  
 
 104. Hearing on Wall Street Bank Involvement With Physical Commodities before the 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 113th Cong. (2014). 
 105. Staff of S. Comm. on Investigations, 113th Cong., Rep. on Wall Street Bank 
Involvement with Physical Commodities 1 (2014). 
 106. Id. at 9–12.  
 107. Omarova Article Puts Questionable Banking Practices in National Spotlight, UNC 
SCHOOL OF LAW (Aug. 20, 2013), http://www.law.unc.edu/news/story.aspx?cid=844.  
 108. Brent Lang, John Oliver:  Did J.P. Morgan Just Get the Idea to Go Into Sex 
Trafficking?, THE WRAP (Oct. 30, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.thewrap.com/john-oliver-
did-jp-morgan-just-get-idea-go-sex-trafficking-106186/. 
 109. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 29. 
 110. September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory 
Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Pt. 
217 & 225). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Board 
extends comment period to February 20, 2017, on proposed rule that would strengthen 
existing requirements and limitations on the physical commodity activities of financial 
holding companies (Dec. 20, 2016) (on file with author). 
 113. Id. 
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IV. PHYSICAL COMMODITY ACTIVITIES UNDER THE GRANDFATHER 
PROVISION 
The FHCs have a “significant footprint” in physical commodities 
markets.114  Morgan Stanley has an oil storage capacity of 58 million 
barrels and eighteen natural gas storage facilities in the United States and 
Europe.115  In 2009, Morgan Stanley was the ninth largest oil shipping 
distillate in the world, operating more than 100 ships for oil transport.116  
Goldman Sachs purchased a Colombian coal mine for $204 million.117  
With such expansive physical operations, it is no wonder that the Federal 
Reserve has raised concerns about FHC liability in the event of a 
catastrophic environmental event.118 
Permitting FHCs to engage directly in a broader range of 
commercial activities, such as physical commodities activities, cuts 
against the principle of separating banking and commerce.119  This 
section assesses the three concerns that the FRB cited in making this 
recommendation:  (1) safety and soundness, (2) competitive issues 
presented by the Grandfather Provision, and (3) the potential for conflict 
of interest.   
A. Safety and Soundness 
Section 4(o) does not prohibit FHCs from owning and operating 
the infrastructure necessary for physical commodities activities.120  This 
power creates safety and soundness concerns because some federal 
environmental laws impose strict liability on the owners and operators of 
facilities whose pollution causes damages.121  Both Morgan Stanley and 
Goldman Sachs acknowledge the risks that stem from their involvement 
in physical commodities activities in the Risk Factors section of their 
 
 114. Staff of S. Comm. on Investigations, 113th Cong., Rep. on Wall Street Bank 
Involvement with Physical Commodities 81 (2014). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 82.  
 117. Id. 
 118. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 27. 
 119. Id. at 30. 
 120. 12 U.S.C. 1843(o) (2016); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 29. 
 121. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 29; see e.g., 33 U.S.C. 1321, 2701–02(f)(1) 
(2016) (holding the owner and operator of a facility or vessel that discharges oil to be strictly 
liable). 
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annual 10-K report to the Securities and Exchange Commission.122  The 
liability for an environmental catastrophe creates financial and 
reputational risk for FHCs beyond the scope of the risks presented by 
traditional bank activities.123  As owners and investors in physical 
facilities for the storage and transport of commodities, FHCs exercising 
Section 4(o) authority open themselves up to liability for environmental 
catastrophes.124  In addition, commodities activity that ends in 
catastrophe could damage public confidence in the financial 
institution.125 
If a catastrophic environmental event occurred in the course of 
this physical commodities activity, the FHC could incur losses that 
“greatly exceed the firm’s investments in the physical assets, the market 
value of the physical commodities involved in the catastrophic event, 
committed capital, and insurance policies of the organization.”126  Many 
federal and state environmental laws impose strict liability on the owners 
and operators of infrastructure for the transport of certain physical 
commodities.127  
 
 122. Morgan Stanley, Form 10-K Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 of 15(d) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 18–19 (Dec. 31, 2016) https://www.morganstanley.com/
about-us-ir/pdf/MS_10K_December_31_2016.pdf (“Our commodities activities and 
investments subject us to extensive regulation, and environmental risks and regulation that 
may expose us to significant costs and liabilities.”); The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Form 
10-K Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 of 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
39 (Dec. 31, 2016) http://www.goldmansachs.com/investor-relations/financials/current/10k/
2016-10-k.pdf (“We face enhanced risks . . . in a number of our businesses, including where 
we make markets, invest and lend, we directly or indirectly own interests in, or otherwise 
become affiliated with the ownership and operation of public services, such as airports, toll 
roads and shipping ports, as well as physical commodities and commodities infrastructure 
components, both within and outside the U.S.”). 
 123. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 29. 
 124. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 29. 
 125. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 29. 
 126. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 27; Complementary Activities, Merchant 
Banking Activities, and Other Activities of Financial Holding Companies Related to Physical 
Commodities, 79 Fed. Reg. 3329 (proposed Jan. 21, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Chapter 
II).   
 127. September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory 
Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Pt. 
217 & 225) (“Certain federal environmental laws, including the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
(OPA), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980 (CERCLA), and the Clean Water Act (CWA), generally impose liability on owners and 
operators of facilities and vessels for the release of physical commodities, such as oil, distillate 
fuel oil, jet fuel, liquefied petroleum gas, gasoline, fertilizer, natural gas, and propylene. 
Consequently, a company that directly owns an oil tanker or petroleum refinery that releases 
crude oil in a navigable waterway or adjoining shoreline in the United States may be liable 
for removal costs and damages for that release under the OPA.”) 
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This concern was raised by the FRB in light of recent catastrophic 
environmental events, like the oil spill involving the Deepwater Horizon, 
which accounted for cumulative losses at BP of $53.8 billion as of 
2015.128  BP paid approximately $4.5 billion to resolve federal criminal 
claims and federal securities law claims related to the spill.  Civil 
litigation is also ongoing, as the parties are unable to determine the full 
economic impact of the event.129  The FRB argues that the costs of 
preventing accidents like these are high and the costs of liability related 
to physical commodities activities can be difficult to limit and higher than 
expected.130 
Banks argue, however, that environmental liability can be 
avoided if appropriate safeguards are undertaken.131  Goldman Sachs 
describes its involvement in commodities as providing “commodity 
intermediation” services.132  Goldman Sachs claims that a bank entity 
engaging in commodity intermediation can preclude liability by putting 
in place safeguards designed “to prevent an owner of commodities from 
assuming the status of ‘operator’ of facilities in which commodities are 
stored, transported, or processed.”133  Though Goldman Sachs has 
publicly claimed it is shielded from liability as an operator, the firm has 
purchased “contingent, third-party environmental/pollution liability 
coverage” insurance.134  Goldman Sachs’ position is that these 
commodities activities present similar market risks to its financial 
products like loans or bonds whose risk can be managed and mitigated.135   
 
 128. Susan Heavey, Patrick Rucker, Emily Stephenson, U.S. Says BP to Pay $20 Billion 
in Fines for 2010 Oil Spill, REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2015, 7:46 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-bp-usa/u-s-says-bp-to-pay-20-billion-in-fines-for-2010-oil-spill-
idUSKCN0RZ14A20151005. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id.  
 131. Letter from John F.W. Rogers on behalf of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., to Robert 
deV. Frierson, Sec’y Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 4 (Apr. 16, 2014). 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. (“Even with respect to environmentally sensitive commodities, an FHC engaged 
in intermediation will not be subject to liability under well-settled environmental law by 
adhering to straight-forward policies and procedures designed to prevent an owner of 
commodities from assuming the status of ‘operator’ of facilities in which commodities are 
stored, transported or processed.”) 
 134. Staff of S. Comm. on Investigations, 113th Cong., Rep. on Wall Street Bank 
Involvement with Physical Commodities 134 (2014). 
 135. Letter from John F.W. Rogers on behalf of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., to Robert 
deV. Frierson, Sec’y Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 3 (Apr. 16, 2014). 
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The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association 
(“SIFMA”), a securities industry trade group,  wrote in a comment letter 
to the FRB (“SIFMA Letter”) that FHCs engaged in Section 4(o) 
commodities business are practicing safe and sound banking so long as 
those activities are subjected to “appropriate safeguards.”136  
Environmental liability typically attaches to the owner and operator of 
the facility where the catastrophe occurred.137  Section 4(o) authority 
allows FHCs to own and operate facilities that process, store, and 
 
 136. Letter from Kenneth E. Bensten, Jr. et al. on behalf of SIFMA, to Robert deV. 
Frierson, Sec’y Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 57 (Apr. 16, 2014) (“We do not 
believe that engaging in Environmentally Sensitive Commodities Handling Activities as a 
Grandfathered Commodities Activity or making merchant banking investments in portfolio 
companies engaged in such activities would amount to an unsafe or unsound practice or 
otherwise be justified, if conducted or made subject to appropriate safeguards when 
appropriate, such as those described in Appendix C.”); Letter from Kenneth E. Bensten, Jr. et 
al. on behalf of SIFMA, to Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys., 57 (Apr. 16, 2014), app. at C-1, Practices for Limiting Environmental Liability and 
Ensuring that Legal Entity Separateness Will Be Respected (giving a sample procedure that, 
if followed, would shield a bank from liability for its commodities activities.). 
 137. Whether FHCs can be held liable as owners/operators of a facility that is part of an 
environmental catastrophe is outside the scope of this Note. For a more complete discussion 
of potential liability, see Letter from Kenneth E. Bensten, Jr. et al. on behalf of SIFMA, to 
Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 54 (Apr. 16, 2014) 
(“Under these laws, the parties responsible for damages resulting from the release of an 
environmentally sensitive commodity include the owner and operator of the facility from 
which the release occurred, as well as parties that directly handle the commodity or arrange 
for its treatment or disposal.  Liability typically does not attach to an entity that merely owns 
a commodity that is released, or that enters into ordinary course contracts for transportation 
or storage.  Nor does liability typically attach to an entity that merely invests in a business 
that is engaged in the activity that gives rise to the release.”); see also Letter from Kenneth E. 
Bensten, Jr. et al. on behalf of SIFMA, to Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y Bd. of Governors of 
the Fed. Reserve Sys. 57 (Apr. 16, 2014), app. at B-4, Joint Memorandum of Law (“Trading 
or investing in physical commodities, including environmentally sensitive commodities, or 
engaging in related activities such as extraction, generation, transportation, storage, or 
processing, may, in certain circumstances, give rise to liability for damages resulting from the 
release of environmentally sensitive commodities.”). 
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transport physical commodities.138  Despite this, FHCs using this 
authority say they can effectively manage the investment’s risk.139 
The FRB’s proposed rule addresses safety and soundness 
concerns by increasing the required amount of risk-based capital to reflect 
the increased risk associated with Section 4(o) commodity activities.140  
Specifically, the FRB proposed a 1,250% risk weight—the highest risk 
weight it can assign—on all commodities assets owned under the Section 
4(o) authority.141  
Some observers speculate that by imposing these new capital 
requirements the Federal Reserve intends to preclude FHCs from 
engaging in these Section 4(o) activities altogether.142  The proposed rule 
requires banks to keep one dollar of capital for every dollar invested in 
physical commodities under the Grandfather Authority.143  The FRB’s 
 
 138. 12 U.S.C. 1843(o) (2016); see e.g., Staff of S. Comm. on Investigations, 113th Cong., 
Rep. on Wall Street Bank Involvement with Physical Commodities 295 (2014) (“Morgan 
Stanley has been participating in physical jet fuel activities since at least 2003. Since then it 
has stored and transported millions of barrels of jet fuel per year, while participating in 
financial transactions to hedge volatile jet fuel costs.  Over a ten-year period from 2003 to 
2013, Morgan Stanley became the primary jet fuel supplier for United Airlines.); see e.g., 
Staff of S. Comm. on Investigations, 113th Cong., Rep. on Wall Street Bank Involvement 
with Physical Commodities 146–47 (2014) (“While Goldman has traded coal in financial and 
physical markets for years, Goldman fundamentally expanded its physical coal activities by 
purchasing an open pit coal mine in Colombia in 2010, and a neighboring open pit coal mine 
in 2012.  Goldman formed a number of Colombian entities to function as the mine owners, 
including CNR, while its primary commodities trading arm, J. Aron & Co., became the mines’ 
exclusive coal marketing and sales agent.”). 
 139. Letter from John F.W. Rogers on behalf of The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., to t deV. 
Frierson, Sec’y Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 1 (Apr. 16, 2014). 
 140. September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory 
Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220, 67225 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. Pt. 217 and 225). 
 141. Id. at 67227. 
 142. Comment Letter from Carter McDowell & Richard Coffman to Robert deV. Frierson, 
Sec’y, Fed. Reserve Sys. Bd. of Governors 5 (Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/
SECRS/2017/April/20170414/R-1547/R-1547_021717_131733_608227617620_1.pdf (“If 
implemented, the Proposed Rule inevitably would force domestic FHCs and the U.S. 
subsidiaries of foreign FHCs to significantly reduce or even terminate their commodities 
activities, causing adverse effects on competition, end users, the liquidity of commodities 
markets, small and medium-sized companies in the commodities sector, and thus the real 
economy.”). 
 143. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, PHYSICAL COMMODITY ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED BY 
FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES 2 (2016), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/
SC_Publication_Physical_Commodity_Activities_Conducted_by_Financial_Holding_Comp
anies.pdf; September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory 
Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220, 67227–28 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. Pt. 217 & 225) (imposing a 300% risk weight on merchant banking and commodity 
activities complementary to a financial activity.). 
  
2018] FHCs & PHYSICAL COMMODITIES 369 
impact analysis of these rules found that the required amount of capital 
for all commodities activities in the aggregate across the industry, 
including Section 4(o) and other authorities, could increase by as much 
as $34 billion.144  
The FRB claims that these new capital requirements capture the 
risk of a potential environmental catastrophe without making Section 4(o) 
activities “prohibitively costly.”145  These increased capital requirements 
would not disrupt the industry, the FRB says, because the estimated 
increase in risk-weighted assets would be only 0.7%.146  Further, the new 
capital requirements are “not intended to require capital against the full 
amount of legal liability and reputational harm that might result from a 
catastrophic event.”147  The potential costs of a commodity discharge 
include legal liability as well as potential reputational harm, which is 
difficult to predict and quantify.148 
The Federal Reserve has explicitly recommended to Congress 
that the Section 4(o) authority be repealed, so some observers have 
claimed that these new requirements are designed to make Section 4(o) 
activities impracticable.149  It remains to be seen if these capital 
requirements will price FHCs out of this business altogether.150  If FHCs 
continue their Section 4(o) commodity activities, having extra capital to 
insure against potential losses could help offset losses in the event of an 
environmental catastrophe and keep the FHC solvent.151  On the other 
hand, ceasing these activities altogether may be the safest and soundest 
 
 144. September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory 
Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220, 67229 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. Pt. 217 & 225). 
 145. Id. at 67227. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 143, at 1; SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 
6, at 28 (recommending that Congress repeal the grandfather authority FHCs use to engage in 
commodities activities); but see September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and 
Other Regulatory Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220, 67227 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. Pt. 217 & 225) (“Rather, the risk weight is intended to reflect the higher 
risks of physical commodity activities permissible only under section 4(o) grandfather 
authority without also making the activities prohibitively costly by attempting to capture the 
risks of the largest environmental catastrophes.”).  
 150. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 143, at 1. 
 151. September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory 
Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220, 67227 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. Pt. 217 & 225). 
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practice for FHCs, given the potential for huge liability.152  Even if FHCs 
take steps to avoid liability by refraining from owning or operating 
commodity infrastructure,153 the fact remains that the law allows FHCs 
to be the owners and operators of commodity infrastructure like transport, 
storage, and distribution facilities.154  Those activities present the greatest 
risk of liability and FHCs would still be permitted to engage in those 
activities, even if the proposed rules are enacted.155  The FRB took the 
most drastic action it could to reduce or eliminate these activities, given 
that those activities are protected by statute.156  Congress will need to step 
in and repeal the statutory authority to fully address the safety and 
soundness issues raised by these Section 4(o) activities.157 
B. Anti-Competitive Concerns 
Only Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley are authorized to use 
the Grandfather Provision to engage in physical commodities 
activities.158  This authority provides three key advantages for these 
FHCs:  (1) these FHCs are privy to insider information that gives those 
firms advantages in commodities activities that are unavailable for other 
firms,159 (2) the Section 4(o) commodities activities are subject to a less 
restrictive activity limit than their non-grandfathered counterparts, and 
 
 152. Id. at 67221–22. 
 153. Letter from Kenneth E. Bensten, Jr. et al. on behalf of SIFMA, to Robert deV. 
Frierson, Sec’y Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 57 (Apr. 16, 2014) (“We do not 
believe that engaging in Environmentally Sensitive Commodities Handling Activities as a 
Grandfathered Commodities Activity or making merchant banking investments in portfolio 
companies engaged in such activities would amount to an unsafe or unsound practice or 
otherwise be justified, if conducted or made subject to appropriate safeguards when 
appropriate, such as those described in Appendix C.”); Letter from Kenneth E. Bensten, Jr. et 
al. on behalf of SIFMA, to Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y Board of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys. 57 (Apr. 16, 2014), app. at C-1, Practices for Limiting Environmental Liability 
and Ensuring that Legal Entity Separateness Will Be Respected (giving a sample procedure 
that, if followed, would shield a bank from liability for its commodities activities.). 
 154. 12 U.S.C. 1843(o) (2016); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 16 (“Specifically, 
section 4(o) may permit a qualifying FHC to own, operate, or invest in facilities for the 
extraction, transportation, storage, or distribution of commodities, or to process or refine 
commodities.”).  
 155. September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory 
Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220, 67225 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. Pt. 217 & 225).  
 156. Id.  
 157. 12 U.S.C. 1843(o); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 28. 
 158. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 29. 
 159. See infra I.B.1. 
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(3) grandfathered firms do not need to seek the FRB’s permission before 
beginning a new activity.160  
The first advantage involves superior information; when a FHC 
is engaged in the mining, shipping, and storing of physical commodities, 
it is privy to information that is unavailable to its non-FHC competitors 
who are not allowed to engage in these activities.161  Unlike the securities 
trading market, U.S. commodities trading laws do not restrict the use of 
non-public information.162  Examples of useful, non-public information 
include:  information about industry price trends, upcoming large 
transactions, supply disruptions, and regulatory actions.163  Banks and 
regulators acknowledge this advantage.  In a 2005 application to the FRB 
for expanded commodities activities under the complementary authority, 
JPMorgan Chase suggested that “the information gathered through this 
increased market participation [in physical commodities] will help 
improve projections of forward and financial activity and supply vital 
price and risk management information that JPMorgan Chase can use to 
improve its financial commodities derivative offerings.”164  This 
advantage could be even greater for a FHC that actually owns and 
operates commodities infrastructure.165  For example, consider a FHC 
that controls an oil refinery.166  If the refinery were to experience 
technical trouble that would affect supply, the controlling FHC would be 
the first to know.167  The FHC could use that information to short oil 
prices, resulting in predictable gains.168  This insider information gives 
the FHC an undeniable informational advantage in commodities 
trading.169 
FHCs also have a capitalization advantage over non-FHC 
competitors who do not have access to the Federal Reserve’s Discount 
 
 160. See infra I.B.2. 
 161. SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 29. 
 162. Staff of S. Comm. on Investigations, 113th Cong., Rep. on Wall Street Bank 
Involvement with Physical Commodities 35 (2014).  
 163. Id.   
 164. Id.   
 165. Id. at 36. 
 166. Id.  
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
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Window.170  The Discount Window is the lender of last resort for banks 
and BHCs and is available to relieve liquidity strains and as a backup 
source of funding for banks and BHCs to meet their reserve 
requirements.171  Any bank or BHC that is required to hold reserves at the 
Federal Reserve is eligible for the FRB’s Discount Window lending; non-
bank commercial firms are not permitted to borrow from the Discount 
Window.172  Though it is uncommon for FHCs to actually take advantage 
of the Discount Window,173 the possibility of cheap, easy to access, and 
federally subsidized credit is unavailable to the non-FHC competitors in 
the commodities marketplace.174  This access to funds creates a 
significant advantage for FHCs who are, under Section 4(o) authority, 
acting as direct competitors to traditional, commercial commodities 
firms.175    
Amongst FHCs, those firms with Section 4(o) authority have a 
more lenient commodities activity limit than commodities activities 
conducted by FHCs under other authorities.176  Commodities activities 
conducted under the Section 4(o) authority can make up no more than 5% 
of the FHC’s total consolidated assets.177  While this limit is designed as 
a “brake” on the purely commercial activities of FHCs, the practical 
effect of the limit is unclear.178  First, 5% of the total consolidated assets 
for a large FHC like Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley is no drop in the 
 
 170. 12 U.S.C. § 347b (2016) (outlining the scenarios when the Federal Reserve is 
permitted to make an advance to member banks through its Discount Window).   
 171. Discount Window Lending, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Sept. 29, 
2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/discount-window.htm. 
 172. 12 C.F.R. § 204.1(c) (2017); Eligibility to Borrow, FED. RESERVE DISCOUNT WINDOW 
(June 22, 2015), https://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/en/Pages/General-Information/The-
Discount-Window.aspx#eligibility.  
 173. OLIVIER ARMANTIER ET AL., DISCOUNT WINDOW STIGMA DURING THE 2007-2008 
FINANCIAL CRISIS, 1–6 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y, Staff Reports) (2015), https://
www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr483.pdf (Listing the two 
primary reasons for member banks to avoid using the Discount Window as (1) a higher 
interest rate than other available sources of funding, and (2) a perception that taking advantage 
of the Discount Window is a sign of institutional weakness and instability.). 
 174. Comment Letter from Dennis M. Kelleher to Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y, Fed. 
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 176. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(o)(2) (2016). 
 177. Id.   
 178. Written Testimony of Saule T. Omarova, Professor of Law, Cornell University, 
before the Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 10 (Nov. 21, 2014). 
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bucket; indeed, with trillion dollar balance sheets, qualifying FHCs have 
a wide breadth to engage in commodities activities.179  Compare that with 
the limit on complementary commodities activities, which can make up 
no more than 5% of the FHC’s Tier 1 capital.180  Take, for example, 
Goldman Sach’s balance sheet.181  As of June 30, 2017, Goldman Sachs 
reported just under $907 billion in total assets.182  With a 5% of total 
consolidated assets limit on activity, Goldman is able to engage in Section 
4(o) activities worth up to $45.4 billion.183  On the flip side, Goldman’s 
total Tier 1 capital totals just over $23 billion.184  Under complementary 
authority, which limits commodities activities to no more than 5% of Tier 
1 capital, Goldman would be limited to $1.2 billion.185  A FHC of 
Goldman’s size is therefore allowed to engage in commodities activities 
worth up to 97.4% more than their counterparts who were not 
grandfathered into this authority.186   
The proposed rules do not address the information advantage that 
grandfathered FHCs have.187  Further, the plain language of the statute 
forbids the FRB from creating tighter activity caps.188  The proposed rules 
do not create a requirement for FHCs to notify the FRB about new 
 
 179. Id.  
 180. 12 U.S.C. 1843(k)(1)(B); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 30. 
 181. Holding Companies with Assets Greater Than $10 Billion, NAT’L INFO. CTR. (June 
30, 2017) [hereinafter NAT’L INFO. CTR.], https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/nicweb/
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 185. Id.   
 186. NAT’L INFO. CTR., supra note 181. 
 187. September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory 
Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Pt. 
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 188. 12 U.S.C. 1843(o)(2) (2016) (“[T]he attributed aggregate consolidated assets of the 
company held by the holding company pursuant to this subsection, and not otherwise 
permitted to be held by a financial holding company, are equal to not more than 5% of the 
total consolidated assets of the bank holding company, except that the Board may increase 
that percentage by such amounts and under such circumstances as the Board considers 
appropriate, consistent with the purposes of this Act.”) (emphasis added). 
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activities, nor do the proposed rules create a requirement for permission 
for those activities.189   
C. Conflict of Interest Concerns  
One public policy consideration in favor of separation of banking 
and commerce is the importance of an objective banking system that 
allocates credit in an equitable way.190  In other words, involvement in 
commercial activities—whether by a bank or a FHC subsidiary—creates 
a potential conflict of interest when it comes to lending to competitors in 
that commercial market.191  Finding reliable data about lending practices 
in the face of a conflict of interest is difficult, but there is certainly a 
temptation for self-serving lending practices and other abuse by FHCs.192  
Consider that in 2011, the Coca-Cola Company filed a complaint 
with the London Metal Exchange that accused Goldman Sachs of 
hoarding aluminum to artificially raise the market price.193  Metro 
International Trade Services LLC (“Metro International”) was a metal 
warehousing company in Detroit, wholly owned by Goldman Sachs.194  
At the time of the accusation, Metro International held over 12% of the 
warehoused aluminum in the world.195  Metro International’s inventory 
of aluminum went up from 893,025 tons of aluminum in February 2010 
to 1.15 million tons as of June 22, 2011.196  Goldman Sachs purchased 
 
 189. September 2016 Proposed Rule on Risk-Based Capital and Other Regulatory 
Requirements, 81 Fed. Reg. 67220 (proposed Sept. 30, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. Pt. 
217 & 225). 
 190. 12 U.S.C. 1843(k)(1)(B) (2016); SECTION 620 REPORT, supra note 6 at 30. 
 191. Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street:  Banking, Commerce, and 
Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 346–47 (2013) (“One of the key policy reasons for 
separating banking from commerce is the fear of banks unfairly restricting their commercial-
market competitors’ access to credit, the lifeblood of the economy.”). 
 192. Id.  
 193. Dustin Walsh, Aluminum Bottleneck: Coke’s complaint: 12% of Global Stockpile 
Held Here, Boosting Prices, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS.  (June 26, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://
www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20110626/FREE/306269994/aluminum. 
 194. Id.; Industrial and Commercial Metals, 81 Fed. Reg. 96353, 96353 (Dec. 30, 2016) 
(to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 7) (responding to the Section 620 Report and a Senate 
Subcommittee report, the OCC issued a final rule that said the holding of industrial and 
commercial metals like copper or aluminum is not part of or incident to the business of 
banking.  Since the OCC only regulates national banks and not FHCs, this rule does not affect 
the activities described in this Note.) 
 195. Walsh, supra note 193. 
 196. Walsh, supra note 193. 
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Metro International in February 2010.197  The supply bottleneck in Metro 
International’s Detroit warehouses led to record aluminum prices.198  
Though Coca-Cola complained, Prof. Omarova expressed surprise that 
more industrial-end aluminum purchasers did not voice complaints about 
this market manipulation.199  Prof. Omarova speculated that “[i]t is also 
possible that commercial companies deliberately avoided an open 
confrontation with Goldman because it was a Wall Street powerhouse 
with which they had—or hoped to establish—important credit and 
financial-advisory relationships.”200  Though it would be difficult to 
quantify the impact of Goldman Sachs’ credit powers on the behavior of 
players in the aluminum market, this incident sheds light on the potential 
for abuse when bank entities enter into the commercial realm.201 
Similar to the safety and soundness concerns, the proposed rules 
also do not address potential conflicts of interest in lending raised by FHC 
involvement in physical commodity transport, storage, and refinement.202 
V. YOU CAN NEVER LEAVE:  THE HOTEL CALIFORNIA PROVISION 
One complication to the repeal of the Grandfather Provision by 
statute—or effective repeal through capital charges—is that such a move 
could be perceived as a bait and switch tactic by lawmakers.203  This is 
because of the so-called “Hotel California Provision”204 of Dodd-Frank, 
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 203. Bait and Switch, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A sales practice 
whereby a merchant advertises a low-priced product to lure customers into the store only to 
induce them to buy a higher-priced product.  Most states prohibit the bait and switch when 
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 204. The Eagles, Hotel California (Asylum Records 1976) (“You can check out any time 
you like, but you can never leave.”); see also Jacob Goldstein, The ‘Hotel California’ Clause: 
Finance Reform Meets Classic Rock, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Mar. 15, 2010, 2:57 PM), http://
www.npr.org/sections/money/2010/03/what_dodds_bill_does_about_too.html (“So what this 
part of the bill says is that, even if these institutions get rid of their bank holding companies, 
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which stipulates that any firm who was classified as a BHC at the time of 
its passage and accepted money from the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
would remain under the regulatory supervision of the FRB as a BHC even 
if the firm no longer meets the definition of a BHC.205  Morgan Stanley 
and Goldman Sachs converted to FHCs in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis to gain access to the FRB’s discount window and future 
bailout funds.206  Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley made that decision 
with an understanding that their commodities dealings would be 
grandfathered in by Section 4(o) and would remain permissible under 
their new classification as FHCs.207  If the authority to engage in that line 
of business was repealed by statute, or regulated to the point of 
impracticability, these two firms could claim that the continuation of 
these activities was material to their decision to subject themselves to 
FRB regulation.208 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite the risks and other issues surrounding the activities 
permitted to qualifying FHCs by the Grandfather Provision, commodities 
industry participants and end-users who responded to the Federal 
Reserve’s proposed rule generally support continued FHC involvement 
in this field.209  These commenters point to the increased efficiency and 
 
they’ll still be subject to Fed oversight.  Or, to paraphrase the Eagles: Goldman Sachs can 
check out any time it likes, but it can never leave.”).  
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U.S.C. § 5327(a)(1)(B) (explaining that the previous section applies to any Bank Holding 
Company that “received financial assistance under or participated in the Capital Purchase 
Program established under the Troubled Asset Relief Program authorized by the Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008”).  
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become BHCs); Michael J. de la Merced et. al., As Goldman and Morgan Shift, A Wall St. 
Era Ends, DEALBOOK: N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2008, 9:35 PM),  http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
/2008/09/21/goldman-morgan-to-become-bank-holding-companies. 
 207. 12 U.S.C. 1843(o) (2016). 
 208. Comment letters were due to the Fed by February 20, 2018. 
 209. Letter from Tom Quaadman, Exec. Vice President, Ctr. for Capital Mkts. 
Competitiveness, to Robert Frierson, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Jan. 
5, 2017) https://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2017/February/20170214/R-1547/R-
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liquidity offered by the sheer size of FHCs as a benefit for market 
participants and end-users.210  These benefits are passed on to consumers 
in the form of lower prices.211  These commenters suggest that the Federal 
Reserve take a closer look at the effect these proposed regulations will 
have on the commodities industry more generally before implementing 
these new regulations.212 
Even if the rule is not adopted, FHCs have been steadily reducing 
their footprint in the commodities industry over the past several years.213  
Morgan Stanley sold its oil business in 2015 and Goldman Sachs sold its 
metal warehousing unit that had been the subject of much criticism.214  
During this same time, employees of these qualifying FHCs who have 
commodities expertise have sought greener pastures in non-FHC 
commodity trading houses, which can offer traders a greater percentage 
of the profits they generate.215  One analyst described efforts to regulate 
bank entity involvement in physical metals as “closing the barn door after 
the horse has left,” in response to the reduction in business that took place 
even before any rule was passed.216  Though it may be true that FHCs 
have been reducing their commodities trading activity, there is no 
indication that they intend to cease this activity; indeed, Goldman Sachs’ 
Chief Executive Officer Lloyd Blankfein has described commodities 
trading as a “core” part of his firm’s business.217  Whether or not Morgan 
Stanley and Goldman Sachs continue to make Section 4(o) physical 
commodities trading part of their business plan, the Grandfather 
Provision is still law and can be used by either of these firms at any 
time.218 
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The Financial CHOICE Act is the banking reform bill that has the 
most momentum with the current Congress, but does not repeal the 
Grandfather Provision and is unlikely to pass in its current form.219  The 
bill has passed the House of Representatives and aims to repeal many of 
the regulations imposed by Dodd-Frank.220  Section 152 forbids federal 
banking agencies, like the Federal Reserve, from establishing operational 
risk capital requirements for banking organizations, unless those 
requirements are based on the risks posed by a banking organization’s 
current activities and businesses.221  Neither that section, nor any other 
provision of the bill mentions grandfathered commodities activities 
explicitly.222  Regardless, that bill is not expected to pass the Senate in its 
current form.223  In general, Republican Congressional leaders224 and 
President Donald Trump225 have stressed a desire to cut regulation, 
including on financial institutions.226  Imposing this new regulation 
would go against that goal.227 
As for the new Federal Reserve Chairperson Jerome Powell, most 
observers do not expect a dramatic change in philosophy from his 
predecessor, former Chairperson Janet Yellen.228  Since Yellen was at the 
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helm for this proposed rule, nothing indicates that Powell will retract it.229  
Powell has stated that he believes in strict regulation for the biggest 
banks, with lighter regulation for smaller banks.230  Morgan Stanley and 
Goldman Sachs are among the biggest bank holding companies in the 
country.231  
Ultimately, the Federal Reserve’s proposed capital increases may 
make Section 4(o) commodities activities prohibitively expensive and 
FHCs will voluntarily abandon those operations.232  Still, the FRB does 
not have authority to unilaterally forbid FHCs from engaging in these 
activities.233  Congress should repeal the Grandfather Provision that 
allows FHCs to transport, store, distribute, and process or refine physical 
commodities.234  Those activities present the greatest potential for 
environmental catastrophe and economic liability, thus presenting the 
greatest danger to the safety and soundness of the FHC and therefore the 
greatest risk to the economy as a whole.235  
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